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In Department of Homeland Security, Et Al. v. D.V.D., Et Al. (On Application for Stay, June 23, 2025), and 

Linda McMahon, Secretary of Education, Et Al. v. New York, Et Al (on Application for Stay, July 14, 2025)

In neither of these Supreme Court stays of preliminary injunctions now facing appeals in the First Circuit Court of Appeals (which court denied the Government’s requests for stays pending those appeals) did the majority of six provide an opinion. What follows are highlighted excerpts of Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent in each, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson.

Justice Sotomayor concludes in both cases that the Court majority is too quick to grant relief to the Administration, on the assumption that it is likely to prevail on the merits and that it (the Administration) would otherwise incur irreparable harm were the preliminary injunctions upheld pending the resolution of the cases.  In Sotomayor’s estimation, the plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits and they and others are likely to suffer far greater harm with the Administration’s policies left in place during the interim.

DHS v. D.V.D. 

In matters of life and death, it is best to proceed with cau￾tion. In this case, the Government took the opposite ap￾proach. It wrongfully deported one plaintiff to Guatemala, even though an Immigration Judge found he was likely to face torture there. Then, in clear violation of a court order,  it deported six more to South Sudan, a nation the State De￾partment considers too unsafe for all but its most critical personnel. An attentive District Court’s timely interven￾tion only narrowly prevented a third set of unlawful remov￾als to Libya.

Rather than allowing our lower court colleagues to man￾age this high-stakes litigation with the care and attention 

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it plainly requires, this Court now intervenes to grant the Government emergency relief from an order it has repeat￾edly defied. I cannot join so gross an abuse of the Court’s equitable discretion. 

I

A

Federal law generally permits the Government to deport noncitizens found to be unlawfully in the United States only to countries with which they have a meaningful connection. 8 U. S. C. §1231(b). To that end, Congress specified two de￾fault options: noncitizens arrested while entering the coun￾try must be returned to the country from which they ar￾rived, and nearly everyone else may designate a country of  choice. §§1231(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A). If these options prove in￾feasible, Congress specified which possibilities the Execu￾tive should attempt next. These alternatives include the noncitizen’s country of citizenship or her former country of residence. §§1231(b)(1)(C), (2)(E).

This case concerns the Government’s ability to conduct what is known as a “third country removal,” meaning a re￾moval to any “country with a government that will accept  the alien.” §1231(b)(1)(C)(iv); see §1231(b)(2)(E)(vii). Third-country removals are burdensome for the affected noncitizen, so Congress has sharply limited their use. They are permissible only after the Government tries each and every alternative noted in the statute, and determines they are all “impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible.” §§1231(b)(1)(C)(iv), (2)(E)(vii). 

Noncitizens facing removal of any sort are entitled under international and domestic law to raise a claim under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 113. Article 3 of the Convention prohibits returning any person “to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 

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that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” The United States is a party to the Convention, and in 1998 Congress passed the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc￾turing Act to implement its commands. The Act provides that “[i]t shall be the policy of the United States not to ex￾pel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of be￾ing subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.” §2242(a), 112Stat. 2681–822, codified as note to 8 U. S. C. §1231. It also directs the Executive to “prescribe regulations to imple￾ment” the Convention. §2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681–822. Those regulations provide, among other things, that “[a] re￾moval order . . . shall not be executed in circumstances that would violate Article 3.” 28 CFR §200.1 (2024)

B 

On February 18, 2025, the Department of Homeland Se￾curity (DHS) issued an internal guidance document direct￾ing immigration officers to “review for removal all cases . . . on the non-detained docket” and “determine the viability of removal to a third country.” No.1:25–cv–10676 (D Mass.), ECF Doc. No. 1–4, p. 2.

Just as DHS circulated this new policy, a Guatemalan man known in this litigation as O. C. G. appeared before an Immigration Judge to seek relief from his impending re￾moval to Guatemala. O. C. G. explained that he had previ￾ously been forced to flee Guatemala after facing torture and persecution there for his identity as a gay man. See Dkt. 8–4, p. 1; ECF Doc. 1, p. 24. He fled initially to Mexico, he said, but had not found safety there, either: A group of men raped him and locked him in a room until his sister paid them a ransom. ECF Doc. 8–4, at 1. O. C. G. accordingly asked the judge whether he “could be deported to a country other than Mexico or Guatemala.” Ibid. The Immigration 

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Judge granted withholding of removal to Guatemala, the only country designated in the order of removal. Id., at 1– 2; see also ECF Doc. 1, p. 25. Because the government had not sought to remove O. C. G. to Mexico, the Immigration Judge did not address his request for protection against re￾moval there. ECF Doc. 8–4, at 1–2; ECF Doc., at 25. 

Two days later, Immigration and Customs Enforcement escorted O. C. G. out of his cell and put him on a bus to Mexico. ECF Doc No. 8–4, at 2. On the way, they provided him with “oral notice that he would be removed to Mexico.” See ECF Doc. 106–1, p. 3 (Defendants’ Response to Re￾quests for Admission). DHS did not issue a new order of removal designating Mexico, did not reopen the prior pro￾ceedings, and did not provide either O. C. G. or his lawyer with advance notice. Id., at 3–4. Mexican authorities promptly deported O. C. G. back to Guatemala, where he went into hiding. ECF Doc. 1, at 5.

Along with three noncitizens who feared that they, too,would imminently be whisked off to a “third country” with￾out notice, O. C. G. filed this putative class action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against DHS, Secre￾tary Noem, and Attorney General Bondi. Plaintiffs alleged that the Government’s apparent policy of removing noncit￾izens to a third country without notice or the opportunity to file a claim under the Convention violated the immigration laws, the regulations implementing the Convention, and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Among other things, plaintiffs sought temporary and permanent injunc￾tive relief preventing their own removal and the removal of putative class members without adequate notice and a “meaningful opportunity” to present a claim under the Con￾vention. Id., at 37. Plaintiffs also requested that the Gov￾ernment return O. C. G. to the United States. 

On March 28, 2025, the District Court entered a tempo￾rary restraining order (TRO) as to both the three individual plaintiffs who remained in the United States and a putative 

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class of all individuals “subject to a final order of removal from the United States to a third country.” ECF Doc. 34, p. 2. The order prohibited the defendants from removing the plaintiffs and putative class members to a third country without “written notice of the third country” and “a mean￾ingful opportunity . . . to submit an application” for relief

under the Convention. Ibid. 

C 

On March 30, DHS issued a second guidance document, which contained a two-step process for executing third￾country removals. If a country provides the United States with what DHS believes to be “credible” “assurances that aliens removed from the United States will not be perse￾cuted or tortured,” then (the policy says) DHS may remove the noncitizen to that country without any process. See App. to Application for Stay of Injunction 54a–55a (App.) The Government says this policy permits DHS to change someone’s “deportation country to Honduras . . . at 6:00 a. m., put [them] on a plane, and fl[y them] to Honduras” 15minutes later. ECF Doc. No. 74, p. 12 (Tr. Apr. 10, 2025).

In the absence of credible “assurances” from a foreign country, the policy provides, “DHS will first inform the al￾ien of ” her impending removal. App. 55a. Even so, the pol￾icy prohibits officers from providing the noncitizen with an affirmative opportunity to raise her fear of torture. Only one who “states a fear of removal” unprompted will be given a screening interview, which will take place “within 24 hours of referral.” Ibid. Those who cannot establish their eligibility for relief at the screening interview can appar￾ently be deported immediately, without a chance to provide evidence or seek judicial review. See ECF Doc. 74, at 52– 53. 

Around the time it adopted this new policy, DHS arrested four putative class members covered by the TRO. As the Government admits, “DHS . . . typically arrests people to 

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remove them.” ECF Doc. 101, p. 39 (Tr. Apr. 28, 2025). In￾deed, DHS promptly transferred the four arrested class members to Guantanamo Bay. Id., at 29. Notwithstanding the TRO’s express prohibition on third￾country removals without notice or process, on March 31, the Government placed all four class members held in Guantanamo Bay on a Department of Defense flight to El Salvador.1 

At a subsequent hearing, an attorney for the Government claimed DHS had not violated the TRO because the Depart￾ment of Defense had conducted the removals. According to the agreement that governs the relationship between DHSand the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, how￾ever, DHS “has legal custody” of noncitizens detained at Guantanamo Bay “and is responsible for the custody of de￾tained aliens for administrative purposes related to immi￾gration law violations.” ECF Doc. 99–1, p. 2. DHS also re￾mains “responsible for the [noncitizens’] physical custody”at Guantanamo Bay, and for any immigration-related“transfers, releases, and removals.” Id., at 3. By contrast, the Department of Defense merely provides security and lo￾gistical support consistent with DHS’s “guidance.” Id., at 4. 

The Government was unable to reconcile its representa￾tions to this evidence. Nor could it explain “[w]hat author￾ity” the Department had “to effectuate a deportation.” ECF Doc. 101, at 37. 

D 

On April 18, the District Court granted the plaintiffs’ mo￾tion for class certification and for a preliminary injunction, 

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holding that the plaintiffs had shown the Government’s process for conducting third-party removals likely violated the Due Process Clause. The injunction requires the Gov￾ernment to provide noncitizens with written notice in ad￾vance of a third-country removal (as is statutorily required, see infra, at 15), along with a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim under the Convention. ECF Doc. 64, pp. 46–47. 

On May 7, plaintiffs’ counsel received news reports “an￾nouncing the imminent removal of . . . Laotian, Vietnam￾ese, and Philippine class members . . . to Libya,” again with￾out notice or an opportunity to object. ECF Doc. 89, p. 2. Plaintiffs thus sought emergency relief from the district court. That same day, the court issued an order “clarif[ying]” its preliminary injunction so as to leave no doubt that “the allegedly imminent removals . . . would clearly violate” the preliminary injunction. ECF Doc. 91, pp. 1–2. That order narrowly averted the deportations. 

Had the court not acted, 13 class members would have landed in Tripoli in the midst of violence caused by opposi￾tion to their arrival. Secretary of State Marco Rubio later averred in a sworn affidavit that “Libya’s Government of National Unity (GNU) publicly rejected the use of Libyan territory for accepting deportees,” as did “rival authorities 

based in Benghazi.” App. 71a. Indeed (he explained) the “public reports of potential migration removals to Libya” had caused such unrest that “GNU-aligned forces took ac￾tion against the two largest armed groups in the Libyan capital on May 12–13, sparking the most serious street fighting in Tripoli since 2022.” Ibid. Contemporary news reports confirm these armed clashes. See, e.g., Armed Clashes Erupt in Libya’s Tripoli After Reported Killing of Armed Group Leader, Reuters, May 12, 2025.

Less than two weeks later, plaintiffs’ counsel received re￾ports of plans for yet more unannounced third-country re￾movals, this time to South Sudan. ECF Doc. 111. At an 

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emergency hearing, Government lawyers confirmed that several class members were indeed en route to South Sudan after having received less than 24 hours’ notice of their im￾pending deportations. By the time of the hearing, “DHS be￾lieve[d] that the plane [could not] be turned around,” but was unwilling to share its location. ECF Doc. 126, pp. 10, 17 (Tr. May 20, 2025). Attorneys for the government also could not confirm whether “the pilot of the plane and the staff onboard” were aware of the District Court’s prelimi￾nary injunction prohibiting the removals. Id., at 16–17. 

More details emerged the next day. At approximately 5:45 on the evening of May 19, DHS provided six inmates of an immigration detention facility with a document indicat￾ing that they would be removed to South Sudan. See ECF Doc. 145, p. 11 (Tr. May 21, 2025). At 9:35 a.m. the next morning, DHS removed them from their cells and put them on a flight. Id., at 16. Short of the noncitizens “yelling at  any of the jailers that they were afraid to go to South Su￾dan” (as the District Court put it), id., at 13, DHS did not offer the noncitizens an opportunity to assert a claim under the Convention.2 

The District Court found that DHS had “unquestionably” violated its order. Id., at 12. Nonetheless, at the Govern￾ment’s request, the court permitted the Government to pro￾vide the requisite process in South Sudan, and it did not order the class members’ return to the United States. See id., at 21, 86, 96. Meanwhile, discovery proceeded on the status of O. C. G., the Guatemalan man with whom this case began. The Gov￾ernment had previously attested that, before O. C. G.’s re￾moval, an officer had asked him whether he was afraid of 

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2 Notably, days before the plaintiffs filed this suit, the administration “ordered the departure of non-emergency U. S. Government employees from South Sudan,” due to risks posed by “armed conflict” and “fighting between various political and ethnic groups.” Dept. of State, South Su￾dan Travel Advisory (Mar. 8, 2025). 

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returning to Mexico, and O. C. G. had responded that he was not. On the eve of that officer’s deposition, however,the Government submitted an “errata sheet” admitting the information had been false. See ECF Doc. 103–1, p. 2; ECF Doc. 105, pp. 2–3. Because O. C. G. had been removed to Mexico without notice or an opportunity to file a claim un￾der the Convention, the District Court ordered the Govern￾ment to facilitate his return. The Government eventually agreed to comply with that order. See ECF Doc. 143. 

The Government has appealed the merits of the prelimi￾nary injunction to the First Circuit, where briefing is ongo￾ing. Pending that appeal, it seeks permission to continue 

its practice of conducting third-country removals without notice. Both the District Court and the First Circuit denied that request. The Government now asks this Court for an emergency stay of the preliminary injunction. 

II 

This Court “will grant a stay pending appeal only under extraordinary circumstances,” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,  Co., 463 U. S. 1315, 1316 (1983) (Blackmun, J., in cham￾bers), especially where two lower courts have already de￾nied such relief, Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Eth￾ics, 510 U. S. 1319, 1320 (1994) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers). Ordinarily, the Court considers the likelihood of irreparable harm to the applicant absent emergency in￾tervention, the applicant’s likelihood of success on the mer￾its of an appeal to this Court, and the equities. See Hol￾lingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam); see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009). 

A 

“[B]egin with the basic proposition that all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with promptly.” Ma￾ness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449, 458 (1975). This Court often reiterates that “‘[a] stay is not a matter of right,’” but “anexercise of judicial discretion.” Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc.

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v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 10 (1942); see also Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 24 (2008). That is so because stays are equitable remedies, which courts may (but need not) grant in order to resolve ongoing emergencies and “‘clear away all intermediate obstructions against complete justice.’” Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271, 274 

(1857).

For centuries, courts have “close[d] the doors” of equity to those “tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which [they] see[k] relief.” Precision Instru￾ment Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U. S. 806, 814 (1945); see generally T. Anenson, An￾nouncing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, 51 U. C. D. L. Rev,1827 (2018) (reviewing this doctrine’s long history). That principle, “rooted in the historical concept of [the] court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the require￾ments of conscience and good faith,” ensures that courts do not become “‘abettor[s] of inequity.’” Precision Instrument, 324 U. S., at 814. 

Here, in violation of an unambiguous TRO, the Govern￾ment flew four noncitizens to Guantanamo Bay, and from there deported them to El Salvador. Then, in violation of the very preliminary injunction from which it now seeks re￾lief, the Government removed six class members to South Sudan with less than 16 hours’ notice and no opportunity to be heard. The Government’s assertion that these depor￾tations could be reconciled with the injunction is wholly without merit. Notice at 5:45 p.m. for a 9:35 a.m. deporta￾tion, provided to a detainee without access to an attorney, plainly does not “‘affor[d]’” that noncitizen with “‘a reason￾able time’” to seek relief. A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (per curiam) (slip op., at 4).

Even if the Government’s overnight notice had been ade￾quate, moreover, DHS also did not provide the required “meaningful opportunity . . . to raise a fear of return” under the Convention. ECF Doc. 64, at 46. The affected class 

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members lacked any opportunity to research South Sudan, to determine whether they would face risks of torture or death there, or to speak to anyone about their concerns. In￾stead, they were left in their cells overnight with no chance to raise a claim and deported the next morning.

The Government thus openly flouted two court orders, in￾cluding the one from which it now seeks relief. Even if the orders in question had been mistaken, the Government had a duty to obey them until they were “‘reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.’” Maness, 419 U. S., at 459 (quot￾ing United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 293 (1947)). That principle is a bedrock of the rule of law. The Government’s misconduct threatens it to its core. 

So too does this Court’s decision to grant the Government equitable relief. This is not the first time the Court closes its eyes to noncompliance, nor, I fear, will it be the last. See Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U. S. ___ (2025) (per curiam). Yet each time this Court rewards noncompliance with discre￾tionary relief, it further erodes respect for courts and for the rule of law. 

B 

In light of the Government’s flagrantly unlawful conduct, today’s decision might suggest the Government faces ex￾traordinary harms. Yet even that is not the case. Rather, following a recent trend, the Court appears to give no seri￾ous consideration to the irreparable harm factor. See, e.g., id., at ___ (slip op., at ___); SSA v. AFSCME, 605 U. S. ___ (2025). Without a showing that a stay is necessary to avoid irreparable harm, however, this Court’s midstream inter￾vention is inexcusable. See, e.g., Hollingsworth, 558 U. S., at 190. 

Besides the facially absurd contention that the Executive is “irreparabl[y]” harmed any time a court orders it tempo￾rarily to refrain from doing something it would like to do, see Application for Stay of Injunction 37, the Government 

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has identified no irreparable harm from the challenged pre￾liminary injunction. Instead, the Government locates the source of its injury in the District Court’s efforts to provide relief to the class members in South Sudan. Id., at 37–39. That argument is misguided. First, the District Court’s re￾medial orders are not properly before this Court because the Government has not appealed them, nor sought a stay pending a forthcoming appeal. Second, the court adopted the narrowest possible remedy, allowing the Government itself to choose whether it would return the class members to the United States or provide them with process where they are held. Finally, the Government is in every respect responsible for any resulting harms. Had it complied with the preliminary injunction, no followup orders would have been necessary, nor would the Government have faced a “sudden need . . . to detain criminal aliens” abroad. Id., at 39. It does not face such “need” today, as it can return the noncitizens it wrongfully removed at any time. No litigant, not even the Government, may “satisfy the irreparable harm requirement if the harm complained of is self-in￾flicted.” 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948.1 (3d ed. 2013); Bennett v. Is￾agenix Int’l, LLC, 118 F. 4th 1120, 1129–1130 (CA9 2024).

For their part, the plaintiffs in this case face extraordi￾nary harms from even a temporary grant of relief to the Government. A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (recognizing detainees’ interests against removalare “particularly weighty”). The Government has made clear in word and deed that it feels itself unconstrained by law, free to deport anyone anywhere without notice or an opportunity to be heard. The episodes of noncompliance in this very case illustrate the risks. Thirteen noncitizens nar￾rowly escaped being the target of extraordinary violence in Libya; O. C. G. spent months in hiding in Guatemala; oth￾ers face release in South Sudan, which the State Depart￾ment says is in the midst of “‘armed conflict’” between 

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“‘ethnic groups.’” N. 2, supra. Only the District Court’s careful attention to this case prevented worse outcomes. Yet today the Court obstructs those proceedings, exposing thousands to the risk of torture or death. 

III 

On the merits of its appeal, the Government principally raises a bevy of jurisdictional objections. Given its conduct in these proceedings, the Government’s posture resembles that of the arsonist who calls 911 to report firefighters for violating a local noise ordinance. In any event, the Govern￾ment has not established a likelihood of success on any of its arguments….

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….Certainly, the Government is not en￾joined from executing third-country removals. The court has only barred the Government from executing such re￾movals without notice, pursuant to the DHS policy, which (the court found) deprives noncitizens of their statutory and due process rights. This Court has indicated that courts “may enjoin the unlawful operation” of laws “not specified in §1252(f )(1) even if that injunction has some collateral ef￾fect on the operation of a covered provision.” Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U. S. 543, 553, n. 4 (2022) (emphasis deleted). So §1252(f )(1) would bar classwide relief here only if the Government’s no-process policy were central to the “operation” of §1231(b) and not merely “collateral” to it. Ibid., n. 4. At a minimum, that presents a difficult question this Court should not decide without briefing, argument, or 

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time for reflection. Even if the Government could establish that its enjoined actions (of providing no notice or process) are integral to the “operation” of §1231(b), that in turn would raise a “‘serious constitutional question.’” Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 603 (1988). That is because, as the Government reads it, §1252(f )(1) threatens to nullify plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights entirely. Recall that the Government claims it may remove noncitizens in the space of 15 minutes. See supra, at 4. Such noncitizens cannot practicably file indi￾vidual lawsuits to vindicate their due process rights. After all, they will not know of the need to file a claim until they are on a bus or plane out of the country. Nor will their coun￾sel, whom the Government refuses to notify. The Govern￾ment can hardly expect every deportable noncitizen to file a pre-emptive lawsuit. Thus, if §1252(f )(1) precludes class￾wide vindication of the right to notice and due process un￾der these circumstances, then it effectively nullifies those rights.

Whether Congress can nullify a due process right by way of a jurisdiction-stripping provision is a difficult question.See Webster, 486 U. S., at 603 (citing Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 681, n. 12 (1986)). The Government has not attempted to show that it is likely to succeed on that issue. 

B

That leaves, finally, the merits of plaintiffs’ underlying APA and due process claims. Begin with the statutory and regulatory scheme governing removal. In the Govern￾ment’s view, once a noncitizen has been found removable, she can effectively be removed anywhere at any time. That view would render meaningless the countless statutory and regulatory provisions providing for notice and a hearing.See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. §1229(a)(1) (“In removal proceedings under section 1229a . . . written notice . . . shall be given . . . 

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to the alien or to the alien’s counsel of record”); 8 CFR §1240.10(f ) (2024) (in removal hearing, the ImmigrationJudge “shall . . . identify for the record a country, or coun￾tries in the alternative, to which the alien’s removal may be made”); §241.8(e) (when a removal order is reinstated after a noncitizen illegally reenters the country, noncitizen who “expresses a fear of returning to the country designated in that order” must be given an interview (emphasis added)); 8 U. S. C. §§1228(b)(1)–(3) (noncitizens determined remov￾able due to felony conviction must be given notice under §1229(a) and 14 days “to apply for judicial review”); 8 CFR§238.1(b)(2) (requiring notice to noncitizens removable due to felony convictions).

The Government asserts that it need only comply with these provisions once, for the first removal proceeding, and can disregard them afterwards. The consequence of that view is that what happens in removal proceedings simply does not matter. The Government could designate any lo￾cation in its initial order, lose before the immigration judge, decline to appeal, and promptly thereafter deport the noncitizen to a country of the Government’s choosing. In￾deed, that is precisely what happened in O. C. G.’s case. 

Where did the Government find the authority to disre￾gard Congress’s carefully calibrated scheme of immigration laws? It does not argue the third-country removal statute provides it. See Application for Stay of Injunction 13. In￾stead, the Government simply falls back on the Executive’s implied authority in this field. Yet “the President must comply with legislation regulating or restricting the trans￾fer of detainees” even in “wartime.” Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F. 3d 509, 517 (CADC 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). It is a “‘cardinal principle of statutory construction,’” moreo￾ver, that statutes should be construed so that “‘no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignifi￾cant.’” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001). Here the Government construes the statute’s lack of “a particular 

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process for carrying out” third-country removals, Applica￾tion for Stay of Injunction 13, as conveying near-unlimited power to the Executive, rendering the remaining statutory scheme “‘void . . . or insignificant.’” TRW, 534 U. S., at 31. To make this claim is to ignore the clear statutory command that notice and a hearing must be provided. See supra, at 15. The Government cannot show a likelihood of success on plaintiffs’ statutory and regulatory claims, nor can it defend the lawfulness of its no-notice removals. 

Turning to the constitutional claim, this Court has re￾peatedly affirmed that “ ‘the Fifth Amendment entitles al￾iens to due process of law’ in the context of removal proceed￾ings.” J. G. G., 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3); A. A. R. P., 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). Due process includes rea￾sonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950). Of course the Government cannot avoid its obliga￾tion to provide due process “in the context of removal pro￾ceedings,” J. G. G., 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3), by skip￾ping such proceedings entirely and simply whisking noncitizens off the street and onto busses or planes out of the country. It is axiomatic, moreover, that when Congress enacts a statutory entitlement, basic procedural due process protec￾tions attach. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 332 (1976). Congress expressly provided noncitizens with the right not to be removed to a country where they are likelyto be tortured or killed. See 8 U. S. C. §1231 note. As this Court has explained, the “‘right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind . . . is a prin￾ciple basic to our society.’” Mathews, 424 U. S., at 333 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Being deprived of the right not to be deported to a country likely to torture or kill you plainly counts. Thus, plaintiffs have aright to be heard. 

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The Government barely disputes these basic principles. Instead, it obfuscates the issue by asserting that some (per￾haps “many”) members of the class should be treated as if they never entered the United States. Application for Stay of Injunction 33–34. Yet even if that were true as to some class members, it could show at most that the class might be too broadly defined, not that the Government is likely to succeed on the constitutional merits. 

Similarly, the Government relies on precedent about the wartime transfer of detainees to assert that the Executive’s determination that “a country will not torture a person on his removal” is “conclusive.” Id., at 29 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U. S. 674 (2008) and Kiyemba, 561 F. 3d 509).Yet the immigration laws provide for judicial review of “fac￾tual challenges to” orders denying relief under the Conven￾tion, Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 581 (2020), so plainly the Executive’s determinations are not “conclusive” here. In any event, the plaintiffs in this case do not challenge anyexecutive determination. There is no evidence in this case that the Government ever did determine that the countries it designated (Libya, El Salvador, and South Sudan) “w[ould] not torture” the plaintiffs. Application for Stay of Injunction 29. Plaintiffs merely seek access to notice and process, so that, in the event the Executive makes a deter￾mination in their case, they learn about it in time to seek an immigration judge’s review. The Fifth Amendment un￾ambiguously guarantees that right.

* * * 

The Due Process Clause represents “the principle that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we sub￾mit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jack￾son, J., concurring). By rewarding lawlessness, the Court once again undermines that foundational principle. Appar￾ently, the Court finds the idea that thousands will suffer 

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violence in farflung locales more palatable than the remote possibility that a District Court exceeded its remedial pow￾ers when it ordered the Government to provide notice and process to which the plaintiffs are constitutionally and stat￾utorily entitled. That use of discretion is as incomprehen￾sible as it is inexcusable. Respectfully, but regretfully, I dissent. 

McMahon v. New York

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Federal involvement in education is not a modern phe￾nomenon. For over 150 years, the Federal Government has played a critical role in supplementing and supporting the education provided by States, localities, and private insti￾tutions. See S. Tiedt, The Role of the Federal Government in Education 19–24 (1966). In 1979, Congress enacted the Department of Education Organization Act to “strengthen the Federal commitment to ensuring access to equal educa￾tional opportunity for every individual.” §102(1), 93 Stat. 670. In service of that goal, the Act integrated the Federal Government’s educational programs into a new Cabinet

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level agency called the Department of Education. §201, id., at 671. Congress tasked the agency with administering a broad range of educational programs….

Congress has also charged the Department with ensuring equal access to education. See §3402. The Department’s Office of Civil Rights, for example, enforces several anti-discrimination laws as to federally funded educational pro￾grams, see §§3413, 3441(a)(3), including Title VI, 42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq. (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin); Title IX, 20 U. S. C.§§1681–1689 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex); and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U. S. C. §§12101–12103 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability). The Department additionally adminis￾ters the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which funds and supports special education ser￾vices for more than 7 million students with disabilities.3 

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Tens of millions of low-income families, too, rely on finan￾cial assistance programs administered by the Department under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.4 Put simply, schools and students in every State rely on federal programs established by Congress and run by theDepartment….

B.

Administrations have taken different positions on the De￾apartment’s value and its proper role in the Nation’s system of education over the years. Presidents Carter and Clinton, for instance, made investing in it a priority….President Reagan, by contrast, submitted a proposal to Congress that would have abolished the Department, see State of the Un-

p.5

ion Address, 128 Cong. Rec. 159 (1982), though he ulti￾mately withdrew the proposal after it garnered little sup￾port in Congress.5  Until now, however, Presidents have rec￾ognized they lack the unilateral authority to eradicate a Department that Congress has tasked with fulfilling statu￾tory duties. Undeterred by these limits on executive authority, Pres￾ident Trump has made clear that he intends to close the Department without Congress’s involvement. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly asserted that he planned to  “‘clos[e] up the Department of Education’” and “‘sen[d] all education and education work . . . back to the states’” “‘early in the administration.’”  

When nominating Linda McMahon to lead the Depart￾ment, President Trump announced that he had directed  

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McMahon to “‘put herself out of a job.’”9 Consistent with that directive, on her first day as Secretary of the Depart￾ment, McMahon issued a memorandum explaining that she would lead the Department’s “final mission” and fulfill the President’s “campaign promises.” App. to State Respond￾ents Opposition to Application to Stay Injunction 58–59 (State Respondents’ App.) (capitalization deleted). 

On March 11, 2025, about a week into her tenure, McMahon announced a “reduction in force” that would eliminate “nearly 50% of the Department’s workforce,” slashing the number of employees from 4,133 to 2,183. Id., at 64 (March 11 Directive).10 The terminations eliminated whole offices and teams within the Department. To take just a few examples, the Directive terminated the entire Of￾fice of English Language Acquisition,11 which Congress tasked with administering the Department’s “bilingual ed￾ucation programs,” 20 U. S. C. §3420; all employees within the Office of the General Counsel that specialize in K–12 education funding and IDEA grants; 7 of 12 regional divi￾sions of the Office of Civil Rights; most of the Federal Stu￾dent Aid office responsible for certifying schools so that their students can receive federal financial aid; and the en￾tire unit of the Office of Special Education and Rehabilita￾tive Services charged with providing technical assistance and guidance on complying with the IDEA. Many of the affected offices and functions can be “consolidate[d], al￾ter[ed], or discontinu[ed]” only by Congress. §3473(a). As for the offices the Secretary could lawfully “discontinue,” 

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she failed to provide the requisite 90-day notice and report to Congress. §3473(b).

The March 11 Directive offered competing explanations for the mass terminations. It touted the initiative as “part of the [Department’s] final mission.” State Respondents’ App. 64. Yet it also claimed the initiative reflected a “‘com￾mitment to efficiency’” and asserted that the Department would “continue to deliver on all statutory programs that fall under the agency’s purview.” Ibid. The Department did not explain how terminating half of the agency’s work force overnight would improve efficiency, nor how it would be able to continue carrying out its statutory functions. 

The reason for that silence soon became apparent. In statements to the press, McMahon confirmed the reduction in force was “the first step on the road to a total shutdown” of the Department, as directed by the President.12 Simi￾larly, when asked during a congressional hearing whether the Department had conducted “an actual analysis to deter￾mine what the effects of [the reduction in force] would be”on the Department’s ability to carry out its statutory func￾tions, McMahon responded, “No.” Internal developments leading up to the mass firings re￾flected that disregard for the Department’s statutory du￾ties. Certain units within the Department, for instance, were told to prepare a list of statutorily required tasks, but the due date for those reports was March 13, 2025, two days after the Department carried out the mass terminations.

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State Respondents’ App. 237. Terminated employees also reported being immediately “locked out” of most “work sys￾tems and documents” on March 11, 2025, making it impos￾sible to hand off existing work to the remaining employees effectively. Id., at 157; see also, e.g., id., at 240; ECF Doc. 71–54, p. 3; ECF Doc. 71–61, p. 4. Communications from the Acting Secretary (whom McMahon had replaced), more￾over, conveyed that “the Department as an agency was winding down, and would not exist moving forward,” so the Department “would not be responsible for meeting the stat￾utory functions [previously] performed” by the fired em￾ployees. ECF Doc. 124–1, p. 6. 

On March 20, 2025, President Trump formalized his di￾rective to shutter the Department by signing Executive Or￾der No. 14242. 90 Fed. Reg. 13679. The order’s operative section (titled “Closing the Department of Education and  Returning Authority to the States” (italics omitted)), di￾rected the Secretary to “take all necessary steps to facilitate the closure of the Department of Education and return au￾thority over education to the States and local communities”  “to the maximum extent appropriate and permitted by law.” 

Ibid. 

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C

I

Following the March 11 Directive and the resulting mass termination of Department employees, a group of 20 States and the District of Columbia sued the Department in fed￾eral court. They argued that the reductions in force “effec￾tive[ly] dismantl[ed] the Department” and “incapacitat[ed] components of the Department responsible for performing functions mandated by statute.” ECF Doc. 1, p. 2. Accord￾ing to the States, that unilateral executive action violated the Constitution’s separation of powers, the Take Care Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Later that month, a group of school districts and unions filed a similar suit challenging the March 11 Directive, as well as Execu￾tive Order No. 14242 and President Trump’s March 21 Transfer Order. The District Court consolidated the cases, and both sets of plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions to preserve the status quo while litigation remained ongoing. 

Dozens of affidavits from Department officials and fed￾eral funding recipients, filed in support of the plaintiffs’ pre￾liminary injunction motions, described the mass termina￾tion’s effects on schools and students across the Nation. School districts, one such affidavit averred, depend on timely disbursement of federal funds to pay teachers and to purchase materials and equipment throughout the aca￾demic year. Even short-term delays in funding can force school districts “to make cuts . . . to staff and programs, dis￾rupting services for students and families.” App. to Oppo￾sition of Somerville Public Schools et al. to Application for Stay 57a–58a. Indeed, by the time they filed suit, several States had already experienced delays related to federal  reimbursements following the March 11 Directive. See App. 64a. Officials at schools and universities likewise attested that they rely on timely certifications from the Department to enroll students on federal financial aid. As a result of 

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certification delays following the reduction in force, aca￾demic institutions have been or will be forced to turn away whole swaths of prospective students. 

Scores of officials who worked at the Department also at￾tested that the agency would no longer be able to carry out many of its statutorily mandated duties following the mass termination. See, e.g., ECF Doc. 71–54, p. 4 (Title II of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act functions); ECF Doc. 71–60, p. 5 (Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 functions); ECF Doc. 71–61, p. 5 (Federal Student Aid office functions); ECF Doc. 71–64, p. 5 (Education Sciences Reform Act functions); ECF Doc. 71– 66, p. 2 (Office of General Counsel functions); see also ECF  Doc. 71–46, p. 5 (Former Secretary of the Department at￾testing “the Department cannot meet its statutory obliga￾tions at the levels of staffing proposed by the Defendants”). 

The Government, for its part, submitted no evidence to rebut the factual record compiled by the plaintiffs. Nor did it argue that the Executive could singlehandedly abolish the Department. Instead, it asserted that the mass termi￾nation fell within the President’s authority because it was simply part of an effort to “streamlin[e]” the Department. App. 118a. 

2 

The District Court granted the preliminary injunction motion. The court found that “the record abundantly re￾veals that Defendants’ true intention is to effectively dis￾mantle the Department without an authorizing statute,”and that the terminations would prevent the Department from “carry[ing] out its statutory functions.” Id., at 2a–3a. 

That unilateral executive action, the District Court con￾cluded, likely violated the separation of powers and theTake Care Clause. Id., at 48a. The court further deter￾mined that the Department had acted arbitrarily and capri￾ciously, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, by 

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failing to provide a reasoned explanation for the termina￾tions. Id., at 60a. Accordingly, the District Court enjoined the Government from carrying out the March 11 Directive, Executive Order No. 14242, and the March 21 Transfer Or￾der. It also ordered the Department to “reinstate federal employees” terminated pursuant to the March 11 Directive “to restore the Department to the status quo such that it is able to carry out its statutory functions.” Id., at 88a. 

The First Circuit denied the Government’s request to stay the District Court’s preliminary injunction pending ap￾peal. The Government, the First Circuit concluded, “d[id] not even attempt to engage with the District Court’s record￾based findings about the extent of the [reduction in force],” “the intent behind both it and the transfer of functions to shut down the Department,” or “the disabling impact of those actions on the Department’s ability to carry out stat￾utorily assigned functions.” Id., at 163a. The First Circuit also noted that the plaintiffs faced serious irreparable harms from the “Department’s inability to provide its stat￾utorily mandated services.” Id., at 171a. 

II

Rebuffed twice below, the Government now tries its hand at seeking emergency relief from this Court. Granting such relief is a matter of this Court’s discretion, which we have previously exercised “only under extraordinary circum￾stances.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 463 U. S. 1315, 1316 (1983) (Blackmun, J., in chambers). An applicant bears an “especially heavy burden” to justify our interven￾tion where, as here, the matter remains pending before the Court of Appeals, and two lower courts have already denied interim relief. Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U. S. 1319, 1320 (1994) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers). Ordinarily, the Court considers the applicant’s likelihood of success on the merits of an appeal to this Court, the balance 

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of the equities, and the likelihood of irreparable harm ab￾sent emergency intervention. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam); Nken v. Holder, 556 

U. S. 418, 434 (2009). 

A

I

The Government’s arguments stumble from the start. In our constitutional order, Congress “makes laws” and the President “‘faithfully execute[s]’ them.” Utility Air Regula￾tory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 327 (2014) (quoting U. S. Const., Art. II, §3; alteration in original). “The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone,” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 589 (1952), and “[t]here is no provision in the Consti￾tution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.” Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U. S. 417, 438 (1998).

The President thus lacks unilateral authority to close a Cabinet-level agency. Congress created the Department,and only Congress can abolish it. The President, too, may not refuse to carry out statutorily mandated functions as￾signed to the Department, for he must “take Care that theLaws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §3.

Rather than contest these bedrock principles, the Gov￾ernment below contended that the mass terminations were not part of any planned closure, but instead simply in￾tended to “cut bureaucratic bloat.” App. 118a. The record unambiguously refutes that account. Indeed, as described above, neither the President nor Secretary McMahon made any secret of their intent to ignore their constitutional du￾ties. President Trump repeatedly called for the immediate abolition of the Department both during his campaign and after taking office. See supra, at 4–5. He directed McMahon to “‘put herself out of a job’” on the day of her nomination, supra, at 5, and he formalized that mandate in

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an Executive Order, commanding McMahon to “facilitate the closure of the Department of Education,” 90 Fed. Reg.13679. Consistent with that directive, McMahon vowed to oversee the Department’s “final mission.” Supra, at 5. Ra￾ther than wait for legislative action to begin shuttering theDepartment, McMahon slashed the agency’s work force in half, concededly without analyzing the effect of those termi￾nations on the Department’s statutorily mandated func￾tions. See supra, at 5–7. 

These actions had their desired effect: As the District Court expressly found, “the Department will not be able to carry out its statutory functions[,] and in some cases, is al￾ready unable to do so,” as a result of the mass terminations. App. 3a. Mandatory statutory duties, including the admin￾istration of federal student aid programs, grants for K–12 education, IDEA, and English language programs, and the enforcement of civil rights laws, are all at risk or currently compromised, the District Court determined. See supra, at 6–7, 9–10; App. 3a, 22a–24a, 74a–75a, 79a–80a. 

The record evidence credited by the District Court and unrebutted by the Government thus leads to one conclu￾sion: The Executive has seized for itself the power to repeal federal law by way of mass terminations, in direct contra￾vention of the Take Care Clause and our Constitution’s sep￾aration of powers.

The Secretary, moreover, unquestionably exceeded Con￾gress’s statutory limits on her authority to reorganize the Department. Congress has barred the Secretary from “al￾ter[ing]” functions assigned to the Department by its or￾ganic statute and from “abolish[ing] organizational enti￾ties” established by law. 20 U. S. C. §3473(a). The Secretary’s failure to preserve statutorily mandated func￾tions, see App. 3a, contravened that statutory constraint. 

As for the limited subset of offices the Secretary may law￾fully “discontinue,” §3473(b), moreover, she made no at￾tempt to provide the requisite 90-day notice and report to 

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Congress.14 

This is not to say the Executive may never lawfully streamline an agency’s work force or restructure its discre￾tionary components, in accordance with law. Cf. Trump v. American Federation of Government Employees, 606 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in grant of stay)(slip op., at 2). Indeed, as to the Department, Congress has provided clear instructions about how an Executive may lawfully consolidate or discontinue certain specified offices within the agency. See §3473(b). What the Executive Branch may not do, however, is usurp the power to repeal laws by firing all those necessary to carry them out. 

2

Before this Court, the Government does not defend the lawfulness of its actions. Rather, in a now-familiar move, it presents a grab bag of jurisdictional and remedial argu￾ments to support its bid for emergency relief. None justifies this Court’s intervention. 

The Government first contends that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an “‘actual or imminent’” harm fairly trace￾able to the March 11 Directive. Application to Stay Injunc￾tion 15 (quoting FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 381 (2024)). Any harms to the plaintiffs from

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the Department’s mass termination are simply “‘too specu￾lative’” to support Article III standing, the Government says. Application to Stay Injunction 15.

That claim is belied by both the record and common sense. The plaintiff States, schools, and unions rely on a range of Department services that support their operations and allow them to receive federal funding. Dismantling those services has jeopardized funding streams and re￾quired schools to divert resources to fill the gaps, causing concrete monetary damages and operational harm to plain￾tiffs. Record evidence, moreover, supports the inference that slashing the Department’s work force by half without any apparent plan to ensure that the Department continues to meet its statutory obligations will imminently cause (and  in some cases has already caused) such a degradation in services. ….

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B 

The equities, too, cut against the Government. While “‘equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives’” as to other matters, “it does require that they shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue.” Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U. S. 806, 814–815 (1945) (citing Keystone Driller Co. v. General Ex￾cavator Co., 290 U. S. 240, 245 (1933)). The Government has continued to press a plainly pretextual explanation for the mass firings in court, even as the Executive makes in￾consistent statements to the public. See supra, at 12–13, and n. 14. That the majority sees fit to repay that obfusca￾tion with emergency equitable relief is troubling. 

The relative harms to the parties are also vastly dispro￾portionate. While the Government will, no doubt, suffer pocketbook harms from having to pay employees that it sought to fire as the litigation proceeds, see App. 169a– 

P19

170a, the harm to this Nation’s education system and indi￾vidual students is of a far greater magnitude. The Depart￾ment is responsible for providing critical funding and ser￾vices to millions of students and scores of schools across the country. Lifting the District Court’s injunction will unleash untold harm, delaying or denying educational opportunities and leaving students to suffer from discrimination, sexual assault, and other civil rights violations without the federal resources Congress intended. The majority apparently deems it more important to free the Government from pay￾ing employees it had no right to fire than to avert these very real harms while the litigation continues. Equity does not support such an inequitable result. 

* * * 

The President must take care that the laws are faithfully executed, not set out to dismantle them. That basic rule undergirds our Constitution’s separation of powers. Yet to￾day, the majority rewards clear defiance of that core princi￾ple with emergency relief. Because I cannot condone such abuse of our equitable authority, I respectfully dissent.